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COn~tit~tiOnal
Law-STANDING-U.S. ATTORNEY
GENERAL
HAS
TO SUE UNDERTHE FOURTEENTH
No NONSTATUTORY
STANDING
AMENDMENT-United
States u. Solomon, 419 F. Supp. 358 (D.
Md. 1976), appeal docketed, No. 76-2184 (4th Cir. Sept. 3, 1976).
The United States Attorney General brought suit for the
United States (the government) against Maryland officials to enjoin certain practices and policies in the administration of the
state's program of care and training for the institutionalized mentally retarded. The government claimed that these practices and
policies resulted in widespread deprivation of rights guaranteed
to the hospital's residents by the eighth, thirteenth, and fourteenth amendments.'
The Maryland officials moved to dismiss, contending that
the Attorney General had no standing to initiate the suit. The
United States claimed statutory authority to sue under 28 U.S.C.
sections 516 and 518,2under the "take Care" clause of the Constit ~ t i o nand
, ~ under a nonstatutory governmental right to sue arising when state actions result in widespread deprivation of constitutional rights.' The United States District Court for the District
of Maryland held that without a specific statutory grant of authority the Attorney General's power did not rise to the bringing
of a suit on behalf of the United States under the fourteenth
amendment. Accordingly, the defendant's motion to dismiss was
granted.

A. Statutory Authority
In 1870, Congress enacted a law creating the Department of
J u ~ t i c e Section
.~
5 of this act included the basic language curl. The United States alleged cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth
amendment, involuntary servitude in violation of the thirteenth amendment, and deprivation of liberty without due process of law in violation of the fourteenth amendment.
Memorandum of the United States in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss at
32-33, United States v. Solomon, 419 F. Supp. 358 (D. Md. 1976), appeal docketed, No.
76-2184 (4th Cir. Sept. 3, 1976).
2. 28 U.S.C. $4 516, 518 (1970).
3. U.S. CONST.art. II, $ 3: "[The President] shall take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed . . . ."
4. See notes 24-29 and accompanying text infra.
5. Department of Justice Act of 1870, ch. 150, 16 Stat. 162 (current version in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
The office of Attorney General had previously been established by Congress. On
September 24, 1789 a bill was passed by Congress in which provision was made for the
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rently embodied in 28 U.S.C. sections 516 and 518(b). These sections provide that the Attorney General shall direct litigation in
which the United States is "a party, or is interested," and that
when the United States is "interested," the Attorney General
may conduct any case in federal court when he "considers it in
the interests of the United state^."^
Clearly, sections 516 and 518(b) provide the Attorney General with both the authority and the responsibility to protect the
interests of the United States in suits in which the United States
is a defendant. While the Attorney General's access to the courts
is not so apparent when he seeks to initiate suits as a plaintiff to
protect alleged government interests, it seems clear, nonetheless,
that when there is actually a legitimate interest of the United
States that needs protection, sections 516 and 518(b) authorize
the Attorney General to sue.'
The statutory language can be interpreted as a simple declaration that when the United States has a legitimate interest to
protect (as defined by statute or traditional standing requirements) the Attorney General shall be the United States' representative in court. The language may also be interpreted as a
more comprehensive declaration that the Attorney General is
himself vested with the power to determine when the United
appointment of an Attorney General "whose duty it shall be to prosecute and conduct all
suits in the Supreme Court in which the United States shall be concerned, and to give
advice" to the President and heads of departments of the national government. Judiciary
Act of 1789, ch. 20, $ 35, 1 Stat. 73 (current version in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
6. 28 U.S.C. $ 516 (1970):
[Elxcept as otherwise authorized by law, the conduct of litigation in which
the United States, an agency, or officer thereof is a party, or is interested, and
securing evidence therefor, is reserved to officers of the Department of Justice,
under the direction of the Attorney General.
28 U.S.C. $ 518(b) (1970):
[Wlhen the Attorney General considers it in the interests of the United
States, he may personally conduct and argue any case in a court of the United
States in which the United States is interested, or he may direct the Solicitor
General or an officerof the Department of Justice to do so.
In the instant case, the Attorney General contended that in $4 516 and 518(b) Congress has given the executive broad powers to sue to protect the interests of the United
States. See Memorandum of the United States in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss a t 4-5, United States v. Solomon, 419 F. Supp. 358 (D. Md. 1976), appeal
docketed, No. 76-2184 (4th Cir. Sept. 3, 1976).
7. The Supreme Court has viewed the predecessors of $0 516 and 518 as giving the
Attorney General authority to protect government interests. Speaking of the statutes, the
Court said: "[Nlo Act of Congress has amended the statutes which impose on the Attorney General the authority and duty to protect the Government's interests through the
courts." United States v. California, 332 U S . 19, 27-28 (1947).
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States has such an interest to p r ~ t e c tThe
. ~ former interpretation
gives the Attorney General authority to conduct litigation for the
United States provided that the government has a demonstrable
interest to protect that is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of
tan ding.^ The latter interpretation gives the Attorney General
t h e authority to determine when t h e United S t a t e s is
"interested" and in effect allows the Attorney General to determine his own standing.
Specific statutory standing has been given the Attorney General in certain limited areas.1° There is, however, no comprehensive description embodied in statute that identifies the requisite
interest which allows the Attorney General to sue. Thus, it is
necessary to examine case law to determine when and why the
Attorney General has been given authority to sue in the absence
of a statutory grant.

B. Nonstatutory Right to Sue
The first judicially created authority for the Attorney General to sue arose in cases involving his right to bring suit to protect
the proprietary and contractual interests of the United States?
-

8. This expanded interpretation was rejected by one federal district court that said
that § 516 "does not explicitly provide that officers of the Department of Justice may
conduct any litigation in which they believe the government has any interest; it merely
provides that if any is conducted, it shall be done by the Department of Justice." United
States v. Daniel, Urbahn, Seelye, & Fuller, 357 F. Supp. 853, 858 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
A similar expanded interpretation, however, was applied in People ex rel. Woll v.
Graber, 394 Ill. 362,68 N.E.2d 750 (l946), in applying what is now 28 U.S.C. 9 517 (1970).
Section 517 states the following:
The Solicitor General, or any officer of the Department of Justice, may be
sent by the Attorney General to any State or district in the United States to
attend to the interests of the United States in a suit pending in a court of the
United States, or in a court of a State, or to attend to any other interest of the
United States.
The court in Graber stated:
While the Attorney General may not maintain an action solely for the
vindication of private rights or redress of private grievances in which the public
has no interest and may not appear in any litigation upon behalf of a defendant
except for the interests of the United States, we think it must be conceded that
the above section authorizes the Attorney General to direct the appearance of a
United States Attorney in any civil suit between private persons in which the
interests of the United States are involved and vests the Attorney General with
discretionary power to determine when the interests of the United States are
actually involved in the litigation and require attention and protection.
394 Ill. at 370, 68 N.E.2d at 755 (emphasis added).
9. See notes 52-60 and accompanying text infra.
10. See, e.g., note 49 infra.
11. See Dugan v. United States, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 172 (1818). In explaining why
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Later, government access to the courts was allowed when the
Attorney General sought to set aside a land patent obtained from
the government by fraud. ''[Vhat the United States should not
be more helpless in relieving itself from frauds, impostures, and
deceptions than the private individual," reasoned the Supreme
Court, "is hardly open to argument."12 In United States u. American Bell Telephone,13this rule was extended to give the government standing to protect itself against fraud in the obtaining of
patents for inventions.
The language of the Court in Bell Telephone marked an expansion of the Attorney General's nonstatutory right to sue, since
the Court emphasized the right of the government to sue to prevent a "grievous wrong upon the general public" rather than its
right to protect the government's proprietary and contractual interests.Vhus, the Court began to show a willingness to allow the
Attorney General standing to sue to protect not only the rights
of the government as an entity but the rights of large groups of
private citizens.
In re Debs15 was the next major extension of the Attorney
General's nonstatutory power to sue." Debs involved a government suit to enjoin union activities that obstructed interstate
commerce during the Pullman strike of 1894. Although the Court
could have granted the Attorney General authorization to sue
the United States could sue to protect its interests the court said: "In all cases of contract
with the United States, they must have a right to enforce the performance of such contract, or to recover damages for their violation . . . .It would be strange to deny to them
a right which is secured to every citizen of the United States." Id. at 181 (emphasis
added). See United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1 (1935); Kern River Co. v. United States,
257 U.S. 147 (1921); Cotton v. United States, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 229, 231 (1851); United
States v. Tingey, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 114 (1831).
12. United States v. San Jacinto Tin Co., 125 U.S. 273, 279 (1888).
13. 128 U.S. 315 (1888).
14. Id. at 357-58:
[I]t will be observed that this broad assertion [that the Attorney General has
no standing] admits that a party may practice an intentional fraud upon the
officers of the government . . . and that he may by means of that fraud perpetrate a grievous wrong upon the general public . . . . [Vhe argument asserts
that the practice of a gross fraud upon the United States, concerning matters
of immense pecuniary value, and affecting a very large part of its population, is
not a proper question of judicial cognizance. It would be a strange anomaly in a
government . . . to hold that . . . there should be no remedy for such a wrong.
15. 158 U.S. 564 (1895).
16. Debs itself has served as precedent for further expansions of governmental standing. See, e.g., United States v. Arlington County, 326 F.2d 929 (4th Cir. 1964). But see
United States v. Biloxi Mun. School Dist., 219 F. Supp. 691 (S.D. Miss. 1963), aff'd sub
nom. United States v. Madison County Bd. of Educ., 326 F.2d 237 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 929 (1964). See generally 84 HARv. L. REV. 1930, 1930-34 (1971).
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because of the government's proprietary interest in the mails,17a
much broader basis of standing was declared:
We do not care to place our decision upon this ground alone
[i.e., proprietary interest in the mails] . . . . The obligations
which [the government] is under to promote the interest of all,
and to prevent the wrongdoing of one, resulting in injury to the
general welfare, is often of itself sufficient to give it a standing
in the court. . . .

. . .
. . . [Wlhenever the

wrongs complained of are such as
affect the public a t large, and are in respect of matters which
by the Constitution are entrusted to the care of the Nation, and
concerning which the Nation owes a duty to all the citizens of
securing to them their common rights, then the mere fact that
the government has no pecuniary interest in the controversy is
not sufficient to exclude it from the courts, or prevent it from
taking measures therein to fully discharge those constitutional
duties.I8

Relying on this broad language, courts have upheld the Attorney General when he has brought actions to protect alleged
government interests. Thus, it has been generally recognized that
the Attorney General has nonstatutory standing to maintain actions to relieve widespread burdens on interstate commerce,lgto
remove obstructions to navigable waters within the boundaries of
the United States,20to protect the government's policies concerning national defense," to enforce conditions of federal grants,22
17. See Searight v. Stokes, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 151 (1845) (holding that the mails are
property of the United States while in transit).
18. 158 U.S. at 584-86.
19. See, e.g., United States v. Brand Jewelers, Inc., 318 F. Supp. 1293 (S.D.N.Y.
1970).
20. In Sanitary Dist. v. United States, 266 U.S. 405 (1925), the United States sued
to enjoin an agency of Illinois from continuing practices that resulted in the lowering of
the water level of Lake Michigan thereby obstructing commerce. The United States Supreme Court stated:
The United States is asserting its sovereign power to regulate commerce and to
control the navigable waters within its jurisdiction. It has a standing in this suit
not only to remove obstruction to interstate and foreign commerce . . . but also
to carry out treaty obligations to a foreign power bordering upon some of the
Lakes concerned, and, it may be, also on the footing of an ultimate sovereign
interest in the Lakes. The Attorney General by virtue of his office may bring
this proceeding and no statute is necessary to authorize this suit.
Id. at 425-26.
21. In United States v. Arlington County, 326 F.2d 929, 923-33 (4th Cir. 1964), the
court held that the government had a nonstatutory right to sue to protect members of the
naval forces from being subjected to state personal property tax in violation of the Sailors'
Civil Relief Act of 1940. Accord, Sullivan v. United States, 395 U.S. 169 (1969).
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and to enjoin deprivation of civil rights if there is an accompanying burden on interstate commerce.23Although basing their holdings on other grounds, some courts have suggested that the Attorney General has "authority to sue to remedy widespread and
severe deprivations of constitutional rights."24
The 1970 federal district court case of United States v. Brand
Jewelers, Inc.25marked the broadest judicial interpretation to
date of the Attorney General's nonstatutory right to sue. In Brand
the Attorney General sued to enjoin a systematic practice of
"sewer" service of process that resulted in numerous default judgments and subsequent garnishments of wages against ghetto
dwellers." The court held that the Attorney General had standing
to sue due to the alleged burden on interstate commerce caused
by the large-scale garnishment of wages." The court also held
22. United States v. Frazer, 317 F. Supp. 1079, 1084 (M.D. Ala. 1970):
Aside from the contractual aspects of the relationship between the United
States and the State of Alabama concerning these grants, there is no necessity
for specific statutory authority in order to permit the United States to bring this
action. . . . [ a t has been determined upon numerous occasions by the courts
of our land that the Attorney General may sue on behalf of the United States
by virtue of his office if the United States has an interest to protect. 28 U.S.C.
00 516-519.
23. United States v. City of Shreveport, 210 F. Supp. 36 (W.D. La. 1962), aff'dper
curiam, 316 F.2d 928 (5th Cir. 1963); United States v. Lassiter, 203 F. Supp. 20 (W.D.
La.), aff'd per curiam, 371 U.S. 10 (1962).
24. Alexander v. Hall, 64 F.R.D. 152,157 (D.S.C. 1974);accord, United States v. City
of Jackson, 318 F.2d 1, 14-17 (5th Cir. 1963).
25. 318 F. Supp. 1293 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). For analyses of Brand, see Note, Nonstatutory
L. REV.
Executive Authority to Bring Suit, 85 HAW. L. REV.1566 (1972); 37 BROOKLYN
426 (1971); 84 HARV.
L. REV.1930 (1971); 24 VAND.L. REV. 829 (1971); 17 WAYNE
L. REV.
1287 (1971); 1971 WIS. L. REV.665.
26. The defendants in Brand had developed a system whereby merchandise was sold
to ghetto dwellers on easy terms. When the buyers failed to keep up the payments, process
servers prepared affidavits evidencing service of process without ever having delivered the
documents to the person to be served. Default judgments were entered and subsequently
the ghetto dwellers' wages were garnished to pay the debt; the garnishment of wages was
usually the first notice that these alleged debtors received. The Attorney General not only
sought an injunction against the participating companies and process servers, but also
sought damages for deprivation of property without due process of law. 318 F. Supp. a t
1294.
27. Congressional findings show that commerce might be obstructed as a result of
garnishment practices since they often result in loss of employment for the debtor that in
turn results in disruption of employment, production, etc. Consumer Credit Protection
Act of 1968, 15 U.S.C. 8 1671(a)(2) (1970).
The trend has been to relax the requirement of a burden on interstate commerce. In
Debs, decided in 1895, the burden on commerce was nationwide and the emergency nature
of the situation required executive intervention through court action. In Brand, decided
in 1970, the Attorney General was considered to have standing when the only link with
interstate commerce was whatever burden on interstate commerce might arise from the
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that the United States "has standing to sue to end widespread
deprivations (i.e . , deprivations affecting many people) of property through 'state action' without due process of law."28This
latter holding apparently constituted an extension that allowed
the Attorney General to protect citizens' fourteenth amendment
rights independent of interstate commerce consideration^.^"
The cases, then, demonstrate that the government's interest
in interstate commerce has often given the Attorney General
standing in the courts when mainly individual constitutional
rights were being enforced.30Some of those cases could be interpreted as granting the Attorney General standing to vindicate
constitutional rights independent of interstate commerce considerations. Alternative grounds of statutory authority or, following
Debs, burdening interstate commerce existed, however, in every
case.

In Solomon the court began from the premise that the executive has no power unless it can be found in express congressional
authorization or explicitly or implicitly in the Constitution. The
court noted that sections 516 and 518
tell us nothing about the nature of "interest" which will activate
the Attorney General's discretion to act. These sections, therefore, constitute no authority on which to base a conclusion that
Congress has explicitly authorized the executive to bring suits
generally under the thirteenth and fourteenth arnendrnent~.~'

Similarly, the court, noting that "the executive's burden of showing the need for an independent authority to act is most severe"
in areas of protection of fourteenth amendment rights and development of interstate commerce policy, stated that the "take
Care" clause was an insufficient rationale to justify allowing the
Attorney General to maintain the action.32
garnishment of wages. See also Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127-28 (1942)znited
States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 112-24 (1941).
28. 318 F. Supp. at 1299.
29. Traditionally, only natural persons have been allowed to sue to protect fourteenth
amendment rights. Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 514 (1939). Some courts have held that
the United States is not a "person" within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment and
is therefore unable to sue to protect fourteenth amendment rights. United States v. Biloxi
Mun. School Dist., 219 F. Supp. 691, 693-94 (S.D. Miss. 1963), aff'd on other grounds,
326 F.2d 237 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 929 (1964).
30. See cases cited in notes 24-25 supra.
31. 419 F. Supp. at 362-63 (emphasis added).
32. Id. at 372. The Constitution directs that the President shall take an oath to

CASE NOTES

After tracing the development of nonstatutory standing of
the Attorney General to its farthest reaches in the interstate commerce context33as represented by Debs and Brand, the court
noted that "[tlhe extension of the Debs principle toward the
outer limits of the definition of 'burdens' on interstate commerce
works a subtle reorganization of the balance of power between the
executive and legislative branches of the federal g~vernment."~~
Furthermore, such an extension would upset the system of federalism in that it would expose nearly all state policies and programs to executive attack.35The court stated that the same principles of balance of powers and federalism "which militate
against extending Debs to the limits of the notion of burdens on
interstate commerce also dictate against . . . [extension of the
Debs principle] into the area of thirteenth or fourteenth amendment enf~rcement."~~
The court also pointed out that Congress
has specifically considered giving the Attorney General broad
powers to sue under the fourteenth amendment and has rejected
"preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States," U.S. CONST.art.
5 3.
The Attorney General can be considered "the hand of the President in taking care that
the laws of the United States in protection of the interests of the United States . . . be
faithfully executed." Ponzi v. Fessenden, 258 U.S. 254, 262 (1922). Such reasoning could
be used to argue that the Attorney General therefore has authority to bring suit to "take
Care" that constitutional rights not be violated.
There is no question that Congress may give the Attorney General the power to
enforce laws by criminal prosecution or civil suit. United States v. Solomon, 419 F. Supp.
a t 362. See, e.g., United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17,27 (1960). Absent statutory authority, however, it is not clear that the Attorney General may sue civilly to enforce the
constitutional rights of others. In relation to private parties seeking standing, the courts
have frequently stated that "one may not claim standing . . . to vindicate the constitutional rights of some third party." See, e.g., Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255 (1953).
The courts have generally applied a narrow interpretation of the "take Care" clause.
The court in the instant case declared that the clause is "subject to . . . circumspection."
419 F. Supp. at 372. Justice Frankfurter has expressed a similar view. Youngstown Sheet
& Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952) (concurring opinion) (quoting Myers v.
United States, 272 U.S. 52, 177 (1926) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
33. The executive's nonstatutory standing to sue under the commerce clause is well
established. See, e.g., Sanitary Dist. v. United States, 266 U.S. 405 (1925); Florida E.
Coast Ry. v. United States, 348 F.2d 682,685 (5th Cir. 1965), aff'dsub ;tom. Brotherhood
of Ry. & S.S. Clerks v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 384 U S . 238 (1966); United States v. City
of Jackson, 318 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1963); United States v. City of Shreveport, 210 F. Supp.
36 (W.D. La. 1962); United States v. Lassiter, 203 F. Supp. 20 (W.D. La.), aff'd per
curium, 371 U.S. 10 (1962); United States v. City of Montgomery, 201 F. Supp. 590, 594
(M.D. Ala. 1962); United States v. United States Klans, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan,
Inc., 194 F. Supp. 897, 902 (M.D. Ala. 1961).
34. 419 F. Supp. at 366.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 367.
11, § 1, cl. 7, and that he "shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." Id.
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all such proposal^,^' whereas Congress was silent as to the Attorney General's standing in the interstate commerce area.38
Thus, the court "respectfully decline[d]" to follow Brand's
"'imaginative unfolding' of the Debs principle into the 'area of
fourteenth amendment enf~rcement"~~
and dismissed the Attorney General's suit.

The instant case is distinguishable from other cases concerning the Attorney General's standing because it did not contain
recognized alternative grounds on which to base such standing.
Here the Attorney General did not sue under any statute, nor did
he sue to remove burdens from interstate commerce or to protect
proprietary, contractual, or national defense interests. Rather, he
claimed standing to sue directly and solely under the fourteenth
amendment. Thus, an analysis of the issues in the instant case
requires more than reliance on and citation of prior case law.
This analysis will first discuss the applicability of balance of
powers40and federalism principles to the instant case and to the
fourteenth amendment context and demonstrate how these principles should operate to deny nonstatutory standing to the Attorney General. Second, the analysis will show that traditional
standing criteria could have been applied by the court to reach
the same result.
37. Title 111 of the proposed Civil Rights Act of 1957 would have empowered the
Attorney General to initiate civil actions for injunctive relief to protect fourteenth amendment rights. This portion of the Act, however, failed to pass. 103 CONG.REC.12, 530-65
(1957). A later attempt in 1964 also failed. H.R.REP. NO. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 17,
22, 81-83, reprinted in [I9641 U.S. CODECONG.& AD. NEWS2391, 2392, 2397-98, 245052. The legislative history reveals that Congress rejected these proposals because they
would have placed too much power in the hands of the Attorney General and would have
improperly interjected the Department of Justice into certain areas of litigation. H.R.REP.
No. 914,88th Cong., 1st Sess. 82, reprinted in [I9641 U.S. CODECONG.& AD. NEWS2391,
2450.
38. The court further distinguished Debs by saying:
It is one thing to give the executive an independent role when there is an
emergency threat to interstate commerce to which only the executive branch of
government has the capacity to respond with appropriate alacrity, but is quite
another thing to give the executive an independent role where the "emergency"
is debatable and all that may be a t stake is the development of policy concerning
interstate commerce. The commerce clause clearly anticipated that policy development is to be left to Congress.
419 F. Supp. at 366.
39. Id. a t 368.
THE
40. For a general treatment of the balance of powers concept, see A. VANDERBILT,
DOCTRINE
OF THE SEPARATION
OF POWERS
AND ITS PRESENT-DAY
SIGNIFICANCE
(1953).
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Constitutional and Policy Considerations41

Liberal grants of standing to the Attorney General in the
interstate commerce context have shifted some constitutional
power in this area away from Congress. The court in the instant
case refused to follow suit in the context of the fourteenth amendment. The court, analyzing the effects of the government's
claimed right to sue on the balance of powers between the executive and the legislative branches, stated that the same considerations that dictate against extending the government's standing in
the interstate commerce context also militate against granting
standing to the Attorney General when suing under the fourteenth amendment." In effect, the court acknowledged that nonstatutory standing has been improperly granted in marginal interstate commerce contexts, and refused to extend nonstatutory
standing to the fourteenth amendment context. The court's analysis emphasizes the similarities in considerations governing the
Attorney. General's standing in interstate commerce cases and in
fourteenth amendment cases. The court could have been much
more persuasive, however, by illustrating the differences between
these two classes of cases, thereby demonstrating that the Attorney General arguably should have standing in the interstate commerce context but not in the fourteenth amendment context.
-

41. When dealing with policy considerations, a weighing process inevitably takes
place in order for a decision to be made. Hence, to conclude that a certain action would
adversely affect the balance of powers in the national government is not dispositive of the
issue. Arguably, the government is flexible enough to tolerate some degree of imbalance
in the power structure. The issue in the instant case is whether the sacrifice in the balance
of powers is worth the good that might accrue by allowing the Attorney General to sue on
the behalf of the mentally retarded.
42. See note 36 and accompanying text supra. It is not clear, however, that such is
the case. The commerce clause is contained in the main body of the Constitution which
distinguishes between the powers of the several branches of the national government. That
portion of the Constitution was meant to establish and separate the powers of the three
branches of the federal government. There is no doubt that the commerce clause was
meant to give Congress, not the executive, the power to regulate commerce. Since Congress is given such plenary power concerning interstate commerce, any independent action
on the part of the executive to regulate interstate commerce could be classified as an
encroachment on the legislative power.
The fourteenth amendment, however, may not be subject to the same balance-ofpowers analysis because it is an amendment and is not found within the constitutional
articles that separate the powers of the governmental branches. Nevertheless, 6 5 of the
amendment states that "Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation,
the provisions of this article." This may indicate that enforcement of fourteenth amendment rights is given to Congress rather than to the executive or judiciary. But see Memorandum of the United States in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss at 18-22,
United States v. Solomon, 419 F. Supp. 358 (D. Md. 1976).

484

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[1977:

When commerce is significantly burdened, the economy of
the United States arguably is injured. It follows, then, that the
Attorney General represents the real party in interest, the United
States, when he sues under the nonstatutory burden-oncommerce theory. In contrast, it can be persuasively argued that
the fourteenth amendment was not meant to give the government
a right that it could protecc rather, it was meant to endow citizens with power to enforce rights against the states. When constitutional rights are violated the real party in interest is the person
who has suffered the injury. Moreover, there is no need for the
Attorney General to sue to protect the rights of individuals who,
under the fourteenth amendment, are given the opportunity to
protect their own rights. Indeed, some courts have held that in
the absence of congressional authorization, the Attorney General
cannot enforce the constitutional rights of individual^.^^
The issue of balance of powers between Congress and the
Attorney General also exists because of the language of the fourteenth amendment. Section 5 of the amendment gives Congress
"the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions
of this article." This language apparently means that Congress
has the power to specify how fourteenth amendment rights are to
be e n f ~ r c e dIn
. ~ fact,
~
Congress has so specified by enacting various civil rights provision^.^^ By "appropriate legislation," Congress has thus defined the circumstances under which the Attorney General may prosecute, intervene, or sue to protect constitutional rights. Since Congress has exercised the power to define in
whose favor and under what circumstances an action will lie for
violation of constitutional rights, it is an encroachment on that
power to endow the executive branch with a nonstatutory power
to sue under the fourteenth amendment.46
43. See, e.g., United States v. Biloxi Mun. School Dist., 219 F. Supp. 691, 693-94
(S.D. Miss. 1963),aff'd sub nom. United States v. Madison County Bd. of Educ., 326 F.2d
237 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 929 (1964); United States v. School Dist. of Ferndale,
400 F. Supp. 1122, 1129-30 (E.D. Mich. 1975). See also Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44
(1943); Curtis v. Peerless Ins. Co., 299 F. Supp. 429, 434 (D. Minn. 1969); Krum v.
Sheppard, 255 F. Supp. 994, 997 (W.D. Mich. 1966), aff'd on other grounds, 407 F.2d 49
(6th Cir. 1967).
44. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966).
45. See note 50 infra. In addition, individuals may sue directly under the fourteenth
amendment.
46. The court implied that to allow the Attorney General to sue in the instant case
would allow the executive branch to encroach on the power of Congress by exercising an
independent role in making law and policy. See 419 F. Supp. at 366. This position relies
on the assumption that the Attorney General by suing is directly or unilaterally making
law or policy. No executive order is being issued; no law is being declared. The Attorney
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Another important constitutional question arising from the
instant case-and one not discussed by the court-concerns federalism policies.47The question is whether the fourteenth amendment should be enforced against the states by the Attorney General, or whether it should be enforced by providing individuals
with a cause of action against states that violate their rights.
Since state action depriving individuals of constitutional rights
is intolerable under the Constitution, unilateral executive action
would arguably be justifiable to enjoin such state action.48If,
however, the executive were granted standing under the fourteenth amendment, the litigation would inevitably be directed a t
state officials, thereby increasing the tension between national
and state governments and dealing a serious blow to federalism.
General is merely suing in the courts to enforce a law proposed by Congress and ratified
by the states.
Any law or policy that might be developed by allowing the Attorney General to sue
would be ma.de jointly by the executive and judicial branches. This is not meant to suggest
that a majority rules among the branches of the federal government. One branch should
not be able to augment its powers or upset the balance of powers by simply gaining the
approval of another branch; our system of government recognizes that each branch can
operate as a check on any other branch. Nevertheless, it is possible that the executive and
judicial branches combined can do what the executive alone cannot. Such was the case
when the executive was granted standing to sue to remedy burdens on interstate commerce. Of course Congress could legislate to negate such executive and judiciary action,
and thus operate as a check on the combined efforts of those branches. The fact that such
legislation has not been enacted supports at least a possible inference that Congress
approved of giving the executive such standing. As the court in Solomon properly notes,
this inference is not particularly strong:
Action by Congress is usually time-consuming and quite arduous. To place a
burden of response on the legislative process would undoubtedly result in the
development of ambiguous policy situations in which, for whatever reasons, the
legislature has been unable to grind out either an explicit approval or disapproval of the policy brought into being by an executive lawsuit.
Id. To grant standing to the executive to sue in the fourteenth amendment context and
let Congress decide whether to legislate otherwise may not be a satisfactory approach. See
Note, Nonstatutory Executive Authority to Bring Suit, 85 HAW.L. REV.1566, 1574-75
(1972).
47. The resolution of the balance of powers question bears heavily on the consideration of federalism. Indeed, it seems impossible in the present context to completely separate the two. If it were decided, for instance, that the executive has nonstatutory power
under the fourteenth amendment to sue the states for alleged violations of citizens' rights,
a direct confrontation of federal and state power comes into play. If, on the other hand,
the executive were allowed to sue the states for violation of fourteenth amendment rights
pursuant only to congressional authorization, a softening influence is imposed between
executive power and states' rights.
48. Executive court action helped to remedy the widespread discrimination prevalent
in the South during the early 1960's. Such action in the courts might also expedite the
process of securing to the mentally retarded their rights. Discussion of the extent of the
rights of the mentally retarded and the application of constitutional rights to the institutionalized, however; is beyond the scope of this case note.
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Allowing individuals to enforce their own rights against the states
through the Constitution, on the other hand, does little if any
harm to federalism policies.
Neither federal nor individual action is the exclusive method
of enforcing the fourteenth amendment. Congress has established
a blend of federal and individual enforcement of fourteenth
amendment rights.4vThat blend has been altered from time to
time to meet current problems in our society.50
The challenge of striking an acceptable balance between federal and state powers while at the same time adjusting the balance between federal and individual enforcement of constitutional rights to meet current needs is a task that can best be
performed by the national legislature. Of the three branches of
the federal government, Congress, through its representatives
49. In establishing the scheme of enforcement of constitutional rights, Congress has
given broad powers to individuals whose rights have been violated to bring suit to enforce
those rights. See 42 U.S.C. $$ 1983, 1985 (1970). On the other hand, Congress has been
careful to limit the power of the Attorney General to enforce such rights. The Attorney
General may bring civil suit only in the areas of voting rights, 42 U.S.C. Q 1971(c) (1970);
public accomodation, 42 U.S.C. §Q 2000a-3, 2000a-5 (1970); public facilities, 42 U.S.C. Q
2000b (1970); school desegregation, 42 U.S.C. Q 2000~-6(1970); and housing, 42 U.S.C. Q
3613 (19?0). Even in these areas the Attorney General's powers are limited. For example,
in actions under fi 2000c the Attorney General must receive a meritorious complaint from
the victim of discrimination and certify that the person is unable to "initiate and maintain
appropriate legal proceedings for relief and that the institution of an action will materially
further the orderly achievement of desegregation in public education . . . ." 42 U.S.C. Q
2000~-6(a)(1970).
Under 18 U.S.C. $8 241-242 (1970), the Attorney General may prosecute for conspiracy against the rights of citizens or deprivation of rights under color of law. Section 242
states: "[wlhoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom,
willfully subjects any inhabitant of any State, Territory, or District to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of
. shall be fined . . . ." If the Attorney General can prosecute when
the United States
a party deprives another of constitutional rights under color of law, it seems logical that
he should be able to sue civilly to enjoin a party from such actions. An analogous line of
reasoning was applied in In re Debs, 158 US. 564 (1895). There the Court reasoned that
if the executive could have called out the military to remedy the burden on interstate
commerce caused by the Pullman Strike of 1894, it would be anomalous to block the
executive's effort to solve peacefully the problem by suing for an injunction in the courts.
It appears, however, that to apply this reasoning in the fourteenth amendment context
would establish a different standard of proof than was intended by §§ 241 and 242.
Because $9 241 and 242 are criminal statutes, convictions would have to be based on proof
beyond a reasonable doubt. If the executive were allowed standing to sue civilly, the
standard applied to civil suits (proof by a preponderance of the evidence) would allow the
Attorney General to accomplish enforcement of constitutional rights in situations where
it formerly was not possible.
50. For example, the Attorney General was given temporary powers to sue under 42
U.S.C. Q 2000e-6 (Supp. V 1975) to expedite the securing of employment rights to minorities.
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from every state, can be most sensitive to the effect that expansion of government powers in the area of fourteenth amendment
enforcement would have on the federal system. It seems fitting,
therefore, that Congress should continue to strike that balance
between individual and federal enforcement through statutory
enactments. For the courts to allow the Attorney General to enforce constitutional rights against the states without statutory
authorization, especially in the face of congressional disappr0va1,~lwould not only smack of judicial legislation but would
impair Congress' ability to balance federalism considerations.

B. Standing
Although the issue presented to the court by the defendants'
motion to dismiss was primarily a question of standing, the court
in reaching its decision placed little emphasis on elements of
standing. The main thrust of the opinion concerns federalism and
balance of powers arguments. Although, as will be shown below,
the cou* reached a sound result as to the standing issue, it would
have been more persuasive had the court utilized the established
criteria of standing52in reaching its decision.
The question of standing involves both constitutional and
prudential limitationsJ3on the exercise of federal jurisdiction.
The constitutional limitation consists of meeting the "threshold
question" in every case by determining if the plaintiff has made
out a case or controversy within the meaning of Article III? In
its constitutional sense, standing is a question of whether the
51. See note 37 and accompanying text supra.
52. Admittedly, the law of standing is in a state of confusion. See Warth v. Seldin,
422 U.S. 490 (1975) (compare Justice Brennan's dissent with Justice Powell's majority
opinion); Note, Standing To Assert Constitutional Jus Tertii, 88 HARV.
L. REV. 423 (1974);
see generally G. GUNTHER,
CASESAND MATEON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW1547-81 (9th ed.
1975). The confusion is further complicated by recent decisions concerning the criteria
applied to determine standing. See, e.g., Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426
U.S. 26, 46 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975); 42
BROOKLYN
L. REV. 390, 407 (1975). In addition, it is not clear that the standing tests
enumerated in the leading cases apply to all types of plaintiffs. For example, in Warth
the Court held that "a plaintiff who seeks to challenge exclusionary zoning practices must
allege specific, concrete facts demonstrating that the challenged practices harm him,
and that he personally would benefit in a tangible way from the courts' intervention." 422
US. 490,508 (1975) (emphasis added). This test may not apply to all plaintiffs. Nevertheless, an examination of the case law reveals that certain tests of standing recur.
53. In addition to constitutional limitations, the courts have imposed limitations on
federal jurisdiction as a matter of judicial self-governance.These latter are called prudential limitations.
54. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975).
,
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plaintiff has alleged a personal stake in the controversy sufficient
to assure the "concrete adverseness" upon which courts depend
for "illumination of difficult constitutional question^."^^ Furthermore, plaintiffs in federal courts must allege some "threatkned or
actual injury" before a court may obtain jurisdi~tion.~~
Congress,
of course, cannot abrogate the constitutional standing requirements derived from Article '111.
Unlike the constitutional limitations, the judicially imposed
prudential limitations can be abrogated by statute.57Significant
prudential requirements of standing include the need for the actual injury to be a particularized injury rather than a
"generalized g r i e v a n ~ e . "Also,
~ ~ prudential limitations require
that the plaintiffs assert their own legal rights and interests, and
not rest their claims to relief on the rights or interests of third
parties." Another prudential requirement of standing is that the
statutory or constitutional provision upon which plaintiffs' claims
are based must be understood to grant persons in plaintiffs' positions a right to relief.s0
In the instant case, Congress had not expressly given the
Attorney General standing; therefore, both constitutional and
prudential standing rules were applicable. By claiming particularized injury of the type warranting judicial relief, the government in the instant case might have asserted that three separate
interests were substantial enough to give the Attorney General
standing. These interests are briefly evaluated below.
1. Federal legislation

The existence of federal appropriations and legislation to
benefit the mentally retarded arguably demonstrates that the
government has a sufficient interest in enforcing the rights of the
mentally retarded to give the Attorney General standing to bring
suit. Standing, however, is not achieved by an intense concern,
55. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
56. Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 (1973). Accord, Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727,731-32 (1972); Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411,423-24 (1969); Flast
v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99-100 (1968); Baker v. Carr, 369 U S . 186, 204 (1962).
57. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500-01 (1975).
58. Id. at 499; see, e.g., Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S.
208, 226-27 (1974); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 176-80 (1974); Ex parte
Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, 634 (1937) (per curiam).
59. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975). See Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249,
255-56 (1953); Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44,46 (1943). See also United States v. Raines,
362 U.S. 17, 20-22 (1960).
60. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975).
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but only by a personal stake in the outcome of litigation such as
will guarantee sufficient adversity to create a "case or controversy" between the parties?'
By acting for the benefit of the mentally retarded, Congress
has indeed shown a concern for the problems of a disadvantaged
minority. It is difficult, however, to imagine that this interest is
a personal stake in the outcome sufficient to assure "concrete
adverseness." Any harm to the United States that might arise
from such a general interest could scarcely be termed a
"particularized injury." Moreover, one would be hard put to discover any aspect of life that has not received the attention of
legislation and that would be immune from government suit
should interest measured merely by congressional "concern" be
deemed to satisfy standing requirement^.'^
2. Integrity of funding programs

Since the Maryland state hospital involved in the instant
case has received a substantial amount of funds from government
coffers," the federal government arguably has standing to ensure
61. Note 54 supra.
62. In the instant case, even if the United States could show some "threatened or
actual injury" to itself, the Attorney General could not sue to protect the constitutional
rights of the institutionalized because of the doctrine of jus tertii. "One may not claim
standing . . . to vindicate the constitutional rights of some third party." Barrows v.
Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255 (1953).
One legal writer has noted the following:
In those cases permitting the assertion of constitutional jus tertii, the Court
has noted the presence of a variety of factors that allegedly justified a departure
from its articulated rule. Three considerations . . . seem to recur: first, the
presence of some substantial relationship between the claimant and the third
parties; second, the impossibility of the rightholders' asserting their own constitutional rights; and third, the need to avoid a dilution of third parties' constitutional rights that would result were the assertion of jus tertii not permitted.
Note, Standing To Assert Constitutional Jus Tertii, 88 HARV.L. REV. 423,425 (1975). The
present case does not qualify under any of the three above-stated exceptions.
63. On appeal one of the litigants noted:
Submissions to the district court reflect that Rosewood has received over 13
million dollars over the last three years . . . through the Medicaid program.
Statutes provide that funds such as this may be expended if the primary purpose of the institution in question is "to provide health or rehabilitative services," it meets standards "prescribed by the Secretary [of Health, Education
and Welfare]" and the individuals for whom payment is sought are "receiving
active treatment." 42 U.S.C. 9 1396d(d).
Brief for The United States at 26, United States v. Solomon, 419 F. Supp. 358 (D. Md.
1976), appeal docketed, No. 76-2184 (4th Cir. Sept. 3, 1976).
The Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare has established standards for
"intermediate care facilities." 45 C.F.R. § 249.12 (1976). The effect of these regulations
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that no constitutional rights are violated in the administration of
the funded programs. In some cases the Attorney General has
been deemed to have standing to enforce the conditions of federal
grants.64In such cases, however, the government was not suing
under the fourteenth amendment but rather under contract
theory or statute. Undeniably the government could cut off funds
or sue under a contract theory if conditions of federal grants were
~iolated.'~
The Attorney General did not proceed under such a
theory in the instant case, but instead sued under the fourteenth
amendment? To allow the Attorney General broad powers of
enforcement under the fourteenth amendment because of the
government's interest in its funding programs would effectively
destroy all limitations on government suits; it is difficult to find
state programs that have not had the benefit of some federal
dollars.
Furthermore, the government often seeks to further its policies by attaching conditions to federal grants. Such funding programs can readily be protected by cutting off funds to organizations that refuse or fail to comply with the conditions of the
grants. Giving the government a broad power to sue under the
fourteenth amendment because it attached conditions to the receipt of federal funds, however, would in effect allow the federal
government to purchase an otherwise unavailable right to sue.
In sum, the government's interest in its funding programs
might provide a "stake in the outcome" sufficient to satisfy constitutional standing to sue under some legal theories. But such an
interest, in the absence of statutory authorization, does not give
the United States standing to vindicate the constitutional rights
of individuals under the fourteenth amendment!'
-

--

and of 42 U.S.C. 4 1396d(d) (Supp. V 1975) cited above is not an appropriate subject for
decision in the instant case. It may be that the Attorney General could establish standing
to sue under these regulations to enforce conditions attached to Medicaid funds received
by the hospital. The Attorney General in the instant case, however, sued under the
fourteenth amendment; therefore, whether he would have standing to sue under the regulations and statutes is not relevant to this case.
64. United States v. Frazer, 317 F. Supp. 1079 (M.D. Ala. 1970). See United States
v. Shanks, 384 F.2d 721, 723 (10th Cir. 1967); Griffin v. United States, 168 F.2d 457,459
(8th Cir. 1948);United States v. Fitzgerald, 201 F. 295,296 (8th Cir. 1912);see also McGee
v. Mathis, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 143, 155 (1866); United States v. Harrison County, 399 F.2d
485, 491 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 918 (1970).
65. See Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
66. 419 F. Supp. at 361.
67. See note 43 and accompanying text supra.
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3. Parens patriae

In Solomon the government claimed an interest in remedying
widespread deprivations of constitutional rights? Under this
theory the government would be acting as a sort of parens patriae.
Such a theory, although available to state governments in certain
situation^,^^ has not frequently been applied to the federal government .70
Even if the federal government could make general use of the
parens patriae doctrine in the instant case, the government would
not meet the three requirements of the doctrine. First, the parens
patriae must assert a minimal proprietary interest of its
The Attorney General in the instant case might be able to satisfy
this requirement by asserting the interest of the United States in
federal funds allegedly misused by the defendants. Second, the
threatened injury must affect a "considerable portion" of the
country's citizens.72Here, the federal government would not be
able to satisfy the requirement. The 1600 persons confined at the
Maryland institution clearly are not a "considerable portion" of
the nation's citizenry. And third, suit by the parens patriae cannot be for the benefit of particular individual^.^^ The Attorney
General's action for particular institutionalized individuals in the
instant case prevents the fulfillment of this requirement as well.
Thus, it is apparent that the Attorney General has no grounds to
sue under parens patriae theory in addition to being unable to
satisfy other standing criteria.

IV. CONCLUSION
Although some courts would happily have entangled themselves in the emotional issues concerning the rights of the men68. 419 F. Supp. a t 361.
69. See note 68 supra and notes 70-73 and accompanying text infra. See also Georgia
v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U S . 439, 450 (1945); Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U S .
553 (1923); Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U S . 230 (1907); Missouri v. Illinois, 180
U S . 208 (1901).
70. At times it may seem that the federal government acts as parens patriae in
protecting the rights of individuals, e.g., when the government sues under 42 U.S.C. #
2000c (1970) to enforce school desegregation. Such a suit, however, is specifically authorized by statute and does not rely on a parens patriae theory to satisfy standing requirements.
L. REV.
71. Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U S . 230, 237 (1907); 17 WAYNE
1287, 1299 (1971).
L. REV. 1287,1299 (1971).
72. Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U S . 125,142 (1902); 17 WAYNE
L. REV.
73. Oklahoma ex rel. Johnson v. Cook, 304 U S . 387,393-94 (1938); 17 WAYNE
1287, 1299 (1971).
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tally retarded, the court in the instant case carefully refused to
view this case as deciding anything about the rights of the institut i ~ n a l i z e d Although
.~~
the decision may affect the rights of the
instituti~nalized,'~
the court's approach reaches a result that
would not create a dangerous precedent for allowing the Attorney
General nonstatutory authority to sue under the fourteenth
amendment.
Granting the Attorney General standing in the instant case
would leave very few limitations on the Attorney General's power
to sue. In response to a query by Congress as to the result of giving
the Attorney General power to sue under the fourteenth amendment, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy said that such a provision would enable the Department of Justice to initiate or intervene in suits concerning
[sltate criminal proceedings or in book or movie censorship;
disputes involving church-state relations; economic questions
such as allegedly confiscatory ratemaking or the constitutional
requirement of just compensation in land acquisition cases; the
propriety of incarceration in a mental hospital; searches and
seizures; and controversies involving freedom of worship, or
speech, or of the press.76

In effect, to allow the Attorney General a general power to sue
under the fourteenth amendment would allow him to step into
the shoes of any private citizen and become the self-appointed
protector of all private rights in order that remote government
interests be protected. By dismissing the Attorney General's
claim in the instant case the court avoided establishing a precedent that could have been misused to allow executive interference
in disputes involving private rights. Although allowing the Attorney General to sue when state actions deprive the developmentally disabled of their constitutional rights would be one means
of protecting those rights, such power should be given, if a t all,
by Congress to insure that the rule and its limitations can be
carefully prescribed. The significance of the instant case is the
attempt by the court to limit a power dangerous not necessarily
in its present use, but in its ~otentialities.~~
74. 419 F. Supp. at 361.
75. The decision at least effects a delay as to when the institutionalized may enjoy
their rights, if in fact they are deprived, i.e., until Congress can act (assuming it chooses
to grant statutory authority to the Attorney General to sue).
76. H.R. REP.NO. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 82, reprinted in [I9641 U.S. CODECONG.
& AD. NEWS2391, 2450.
L. REV.109,
77. Note, Growing Executive Power and the Constitution, 4 SYRACUSE
117 (1952).

